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A TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF IMPLICIT LEARNING AND TACIT KNOWLEDGE
AND THE HEURISTIC VALUE OF METHODS USED TO SUBSTANTIATE
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ABSTACT
Two central topics of debate persist in the field of implicit learning (IL): (1) whether
learning and the subsequent knowledge acquired during artificial grammar learning
(AGL) tasks are best characterized as conscious or unconscious, (2) whether the acquired
knowledge is bound more to physical characteristics of the stimuli or is more abstract in
nature. Participants in this study received extensive training with nonsense letter strings
(e.g., VJTVXJ). All strings were seemingly random, but some contained a pattern that
could be detected. Results indicated that chunks of information made available in the
letter strings were accessible to passive and active learning mechanisms, which led to the
development of abstract knowledge that can best be characterized as intuition. The
experimental design was such as to encourage either conscious or unconscious
knowledge. Subjective measures and post-tests were used to distinguish the difference.
All corresponded well, providing evidence of their validity and of their heuristic value for
establishing evidence of unconscious cognitive processes.
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INTRODUCTION
Implicit learning (IL) is a term conceived by Reber (1967) to describe learning
recognized in his first artificial grammar learning (AGL) tasks. Reber’s original
description of IL included unconscious and abstract characterizations. These
characterizations are the principal focus of the current research. Both have been the topic
of numerous ongoing debates. The AGL transfer task paradigm has proven very useful at
addressing the role of consciousness and the type of knowledge representations that IL
creates. This study employed a variant of the AGL paradigm designed to include
manipulations that will best address these issues. Methods that have been advanced in
direct response to past (and on-going) criticisms were also incorporated into the design.
Of these criticisms, appropriate control conditions and valid measures of consciousness
have been points of persistent contention. This study incorporated the most empirically
valid control conditions and measures of consciousness suggested to date. A time-series
design was used to provide for higher levels of training and skill development, as
investigators in the field have argued that such experiments are greatly needed (Mathews,
1997; Dienes, 2008; Johanson, 2009).
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BACKGROUND
The definition of IL has met many challenges since the introduction of the
concept by Reber (1967). Frensch (1998), who addressed this issue at length, defines IL
as “the non-intentional and automatic acquisition of knowledge about structural relations
between objects or events” (p.96). This is an intentionally neutral definition as it does
not mention consciousness, nor does it address the exact nature of the IL-acquired
knowledge—the more contentious components of the on-going debate. The consensus
maintained is that IL operates largely outside of consciousness and is abstract in (some)
form. IL is characterized by the following: (a) adaptation to detected environmental
patterns without the intention to learn from such regularities, (b) the acquisition of
knowledge of which the individual lacks a definitive sense of awareness, and (c) the lack
of processing typically ascribed to conscious learning conditions, such as hypothesistesting or making inferences (Perruchet and Pacton, 2006). These three characteristics
taken together can be used to formulate an operational definition of IL that provides for
quantifiable measures of both unconscious knowledge and learning, as well as for
representational form.
Researchers have not reached consensus on an operational definition for the
cognitive unconscious because definitions vary based on the measures used to establish
consciousness itself (Destrebecqz and Peigneux, 2005). However, an operational
definition for consciousness can be framed by applying assumptions based in theories of
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consciousness. Higher-order Thought (HOT) theories are presupposed when Dienes
(1997) suggests that two basic criteria must be established to indicate unconscious
knowledge: (1) the presence of knowledge, (2) the lack of metaknowledge (i.e.,
knowledge of knowledge). Establishing an operational definition for conscious processes
also benefits from the degree of consensus that has been established on the conscious
nature of working memory (WM). WM is traditionally defined as immediate memory
with active elements such as perceptual input, rehearsal, and recall (Baddeley, 1998);
elements theorized to be verbally accessible (e.g., Baars, 2002). WM has also been
linked to conscious (explicit) learning processes such as hypothesis testing and drawing
inferences (Dienes, 2008a). Another characteristic of consciousness includes the ability
to control the use of acquired knowledge (Jacoby, 1991). Based on these characteristics,
consciousness knowledge can be generally defined as knowledge that an individual is
aware of, that is verbally accessible, able to be recalled, and can be controlled. The
cognitive unconscious, then, can be defined by performance measures that lack the
characteristics used to define consciousness. Thus, a working operational definition of
unconscious knowledge can be stated as follows: Unconscious (i.e., Tacit) knowledge is
knowledge that an individual is unaware of, that is inaccessible to verbal report and
recall, and is outside of an individual’s control. This definition establishes the need for
indirect measures. Three indirect measures are described in later sections that were
employed in the current research in an effort to assess the unconscious nature and
representational form of IL and tacit knowledge.
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The Artificial Grammar Learning Paradigm
The artificial grammar learning (AGL) paradigm has been the most widely used
method to research IL and tacit knowledge. In these studies, some variety of a finite-state
artificial (i.e., nonsense) grammar (Figure 1) is used to generate a series of elements (e.g.,
a string of letters of a particular length exemplifying an instantiation of the grammar,
otherwise referred to as a grammar exemplar) where the order of the elements is
governed by a complex set of rules described by the grammar (e.g., Reber, 1967).

	
  
Figure 1. Pictured is the artificial grammar used by Reber (1965, p. 856) to generate test exemplars. The
exemplar VXVS is constructed by beginning with V at the left and adding the letters X, V, and S as you
proceed to the right. TXSP would be considered a non-grammatical string because it cannot be constructed
by taking any path through the grammar.

AGL studies traditionally involve two stages: a learning stage where participants are
asked to memorize a subset of exemplars generated by the grammar, and a testing phase
where participants are informed that sequences were rule-governed (though are not
informed of the rule). Following training and immediately before testing, participants are
informed of the rule-governed structure of the grammatical exemplars. They are then
presented with a series of testing exemplars, only half of which obey the rules of the
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grammar, and are asked to determine which exemplars match the rules (e.g., Reber,
1967). Participant performance is usually above chance (typically 60%-70%) in the
classification task, despite difficulty by the participants to describe how they performed
the classification task (Mathews et al., 1989; Reber, 1967). This above-chance
performance has been attributed to participants having learned implicitly (i.e.,
unconsciously) the abstract, representational rules that govern the structure of the
grammar (Reber, 1993). Debates center on whether abstract knowledge representations
are acquired or whether knowledge is bound to the perceptual1 features of the stimuli. To
phrase it another way, ‘abstract’ refers to a form of representation that is not bound
directly to stimulus characteristics (e.g., a letter or a particular font) but rather involves
the acquisition of the ‘deep’ rules of the AG employed to create exemplars. This
distinction is tested traditionally by employing AGL transfer tasks, where the identical
AG is used to create training and testing exemplars with different perceptual domains
(e.g., a switch in letter set). The following section provides a description of the three
core representational models of IL-acquired knowledge.
Representational Form of the Knowledge Acquired during an AGL Task
A number of models have been suggested for the form of cognitive representation
that is acquired during AGL tasks. Three core models are offered below that range from
stimulus-specific to abstract forms of representation. In this context, abstract is defined
along its own continuum. At one end, abstract representations are more closely bound to
stimulus characteristics. At the other end, representations are characterized almost
exclusively by symbolic representations. As has been consistently recognized over the
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years (Reber, 1989, 1993; Greenwald, 1992; Frensch, 1998; Pothos, 2007), a
considerable literature exists in support of each of the models.
The Exemplar Based View
Exemplar-based models suggest that when stimuli are encountered a ‘raw’ form
of each stimulus is encoded, establishing a large memory of stored exemplars, which can
then be used to determine grammaticality through comparison of novel stimuli to those
stored in memory (Brooks and Vokey, 1991; Manza and Reber, 1997). According to the
exemplar view, similarities are detected between trained and tested stimuli and compared
by ‘analogy’ (i.e., a stored exemplar is found to be analogous to a novel one) rather than
the learning of abstract, algebra-like2 rules (Brooks and Vokey, 1991).
In this sense, exemplar based models do have an abstract component, which is the
ability to compare exemplars through the process of analogy. However, the process of
comparing exemplars based on abstract analogies is more closely bound to the stimulus
characteristics and does not require the creation of symbolic representations of the
exemplar components (e.g., algebra-like variables). This conceptual distinction regarding
“abstract” is the topic of much of the representational debate and was addressed in the
current research. Exemplar-based views represent holistic theory, as whole exemplars are
encoded (Reber, 1997). They are contrasted against the chunk theories presented next.
Fragmentary Account of ‘Chunks’ of Information
The term chunking refers to the process of breaking complex stimuli (e.g.,
exemplars) into fragments that are more accessible for encoding. The general challenge
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2	
  The

term ‘algebra-like’ refers to the process of learning through the abstraction of variables that represent
elemental stimuli, rather than learning being bound solely to stimuli. This abstract variable-form can then
be used to establish rules of operation and co-variant relationships, which can be generalized to other
stimulus structures (e.g., stimuli composed of different letter types, or even non-letter stimuli, such as
shapes or sounds).
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to both the abstractionist view and the exemplar view described above is that an account
for learning and transfer of learning can be based on the detection of two and three
element groupings that are present in both training and testing exemplars (Manza and
Reber, 1997). A variety of models exist that suggest some form of chunking that is
involved in AGL, each providing different interpretations of the use of chunks (e.g.,
Perruchet and Peacteau, 1990; Servan-Schreiber and Anderson, 1990; see Reber, 1993 for
review).
The Competitive Chunking Network (CCN) model described by Servan-Schreiber
and Anderson (1990) suggests that chunks are arranged in hierarchical fashion from
small, two and three element groups, to larger chunks that eventually establish a
memorial representation of longer grammatical exemplars. The PARSER model
advanced by Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) similarly relies upon chunks, but in their case,
the chunks are used to create rules for the grammaticality of exemplars. The rules in
PARSER are still bound to the stimulus features and thus are contrasted against the
algebra-like abstraction indicative of Reber rules (cf. Reber, 1989a, 1993). To clarify,
Vokey and Brooks (1991) characterize PARSER rules as “relational or abstract analogy
to prior instances, rather than to implicitly abstracted knowledge” (p. 321). PARSER
represents a localist representation in that learning is bound to co-occurring elements
(i.e., chunks), though other chunking model provide for more distributed representations
that allow for increasingly more complex forms of representation (Boucher and Dienes,
2003). Hybrid models have also been developed where knowledge acquired in an AGL
study is comprised of both chunks and some abstract features (e.g., detection of
symmetry across halves of the letter string— PTTT.CXXX) of the stimulus display
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(Mathews, et al., 1989). Most exemplar or episodic accounts of IL have assumed that the
knowledge of exemplars or episodes that is acquired during training is explicit or
conscious (e.g., Perruchet and Pacteau, 1990; Shanks and St. John, 1994). This
assumption is rarely put to the test (Berry, 1997). The current research addressed directly
the role chunks play in the learning found in AGL tasks by controlling chunk position
during training and classification tasks (described below). By this method, the extent to
which chunk-based information is relied upon to make grammaticality judgments can be
determined, along with the conscious or unconscious nature of this knowledge.
The Abstractionist View
Implicitly acquired knowledge has long been considered abstract and independent
of stimulus form, perceptual domain, and sensory modality (Reber, 1985, 1989, 1993;
McAndrews and Moscovitch, 1985; Allen and Reber, 1980). In this particular view, the
emphasis has been on the structural relationships among stimuli that establish a ‘deep’
abstract representational form of knowledge that is not bound directly to specific physical
characteristics of the stimuli (Reber, 1985). One of the more appealing aspects of the
abstractive view is that it endures as a reasonable account for learning observed in
transfer tasks (Reber, 1993).
Chunks and the Abstractionist View. As has been established above, the process of
chunking information is well represented in models of IL (at least as explanatory for
learning in AGL studies). The process of chunking may also have intuitive appeal in that
humans often learn through the process of associating elements into novel entities.
Indeed, Reber (1989a) maintains an important role of detecting simple associations in his
abstractionist account, where unconscious knowledge is established based on such
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associations (Reber, 1989a). Vokey and Brooks (1991) provide a context for the
theoretical distinctions described above:
Obviously, humans are capable of forming and using
abstract knowledge. However, one cannot merely assume
that the unquestioned existence of human abstract ability
means that performance in [AGL] is based on abstract
knowledge without forfeiting any possibility of discovering
the conditions under which abstract knowledge is formed
(p. 321).
This consideration does not refute the possibility of abstract forms of knowledge; it
suggests that if learning can be described by other means, then these means should be
entertained. As has been observed, all of the preceding views are supported in the
existing literature and each may be a more or less appropriate description of data
depending on the experimental technique used to generate behavioral data (Reber, 1997).
Domain Transfer Studies with Artificial Grammars
Domain transfer studies involve a switch in domain from training to testing
conditions (e.g., a switch to a different set of letters at testing than was used during
training). If knowledge is applied successfully despite a shift in perceptual domain, it
can be suggested that it has an abstract representational form (Reber, 1989). The ability to
classify exemplars at levels well above chance, despite changes in letter set, has been
consistently recognized in the literature (e.g., Reber & Allen, 1978; Reber & Lewis,
1977; Manza and Reber, 1998; Mathews et al., 1989; Brooks and Vokey, 1991;
Whittlesea and Dorken, 1993).
Three instructional manipulations are commonly used in transfer studies to
establish learning conditions that either promote or discourage the conscious use of chunk
information. Observation instructions ask participants to simply attend to exemplars
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generated by the AG; these instructions are used to establish incidental learning
conditions (Brooks and Vokey, 1991; Perruchet and Pacteau, 1990; Reber et al., 1980).
Incidental learning conditions are theorized to promote IL and tacit knowledge of a more
abstract nature (Reber, 1989). Memorization instructions require participants to
memorize and reproduce exemplars in accordance with some specified performance
criterion (Reber, 1969; Reber and Lewis, 1977). Participants are not informed of the
rules of the grammar; hence, these instructions have also been used to establish incidental
learning conditions. However, since this instructional manipulation encourages the use
of memorization strategies, knowledge may be more conscious and thus more explicit in
nature (Reber, 1989). Rule-searching instructions ask that participants actively search for
the underlying grammatical rules used to construct exemplars (e.g., Mathews et al.,
1989). Instructions of this kind are meant to encourage intentional learning strategies
(e.g., making associations and inferences or hypothesis testing) that are consciously
available and thus able to be described (Reber, 1989). In sum, observational and
memorization instructions are employed to encourage incidental learning (i.e., implicit
learning) and unconscious knowledge, whereas rule-search instructions are meant to
promote intentional learning (i.e., explicit learning) and conscious knowledge (Shanks
and St. John, 1994).
An instruction manipulation is proposed for the present study for the purposes of
creating the most distinct incidental and intentional learning conditions possible. As has
been hypothesized, observation-only instructions promote incidental learning better than
memorization instructions because the latter may encourage intentional learning through
the application of memorizing strategies (Reber, 1989). However, simply asking
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participants to observe exemplars over extended training may lead to a lax in participant
motivation (i.e., sitting in front of computer monitor for extended periods of time just
staring at nonsense exemplars might lead to “mind wandering”; Reber, 1989). In an
effort to encourage incidental learning (and thus abstraction) and to address possible
motivation concerns, “familiarize” instructions will be given to participants. In this way,
training should be more engaging for the participants, while reducing the chance of a
memory-strategy confound. Moreover, recent studies addressing familiarity have shown
that it is often associated with unconscious knowledge (Scott and Dienes, 2008; 2010).
The main consideration with these manipulations is to encourage as much abstract and
unconscious knowledge as possible in the incidental learning conditions, this, in order to
provide the best contrast to the explicit and conscious knowledge in intentional learning
conditions. By this method, measures of consciousness can determine best which
processes are operating across training and transfer test conditions. Familiarity
judgments will be asked of participants during training and are a non-invasive way to
collect data in incidental learning conditions (Scott and Dienes, 2008). The task of
determining if an exemplar is more or less familiar does not alter the task as much as,
say, asking participants in the memorization condition to make grammaticality judgments
(Reber, 1989). In this way, learning and knowledge acquired during training in the
incidental learning conditions can be tracked over time and compared to intentional
learning conditions. This is one of the more appealing methods of the Mathews et al.
research design, against which this study was patterned.
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Mathews et al., 1989 Study
The current study was patterned roughly against the Mathews et al. (1989) AGL
transfer study (Experiments 1&3). The Mathews study tested a variety of IL
characteristics, including the abstract and unconscious nature of IL and tacit knowledge
that are the focus this research. Mathews provided two instruction conditions, memorybased (incidental) and rule-search (intentional) instructions, extended training over a
four-week period, and employed yoked participants throughout. Participants in the
memory-based condition were asked to memorize exemplars during training to prepare
for a memory test to be given each week. This was the incidental learning condition and
it was expected that it would promote IL of the underlying grammatical structure.
Participants in rule-search conditions were told from the start that the exemplars were
constructed based on a complex set of rules and to try to determine the nature of the rules.
This intentional learning condition, it was hypothesized, would promote explicit learning
based on bi- and trigram chunks. On each of the 4 weeks, participants were first trained
with a list of 20 grammatical exemplars and were then given 200 classification trials at
test. In this way, a measure of learning over time was provided and each testing condition
served as additional training condition (an intent of the design). Importantly, Mathews
extended the incidental learning condition over a 3-week period (a new method at the
time). As opposed to being informed that exemplars were rule governed before testing in
the incidental condition, as is standard, this information was withheld until the final week
of testing. All prior weeks of testing asked participants to make “similarity” rather than
grammaticality judgments. It was suggested that similarity judgments would not create
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situations where participants would shift to a rule-searching strategy to make
grammaticality judgments, effectively frustrating any further incidental learning.
Training and testing conditions each week shared the following characteristics.
Participants were asked to study 20 valid strings and were then presented with a five
alternate-forced-choice (AFC) task consisting of one grammatical exemplar and four
ungrammatical exemplars with 1, 2, 3, or 4 grammatical violations. This method was
employed to detect early learning that may not be detected by providing only two choices
(i.e., a 2-AFC task). It was hypothesized that participants would select exemplars with
fewer violations over training. This hypothesis held.
Yoked participants were used in the Mathews study to measure explicit
knowledge. In the yoked conditions, participant “instructors” were asked to provide
instructions about how they were making their classification judgments to another
‘unseen’ participant. They were informed that their instructions would be the only thing
used by their yoked counterparts to make their grammaticality judgments. Yoked
conditions were used only under rule-search conditions, as asking participants to describe
what makes exemplars ‘similar’ in the incidental conditions confounds the implicit
condition by asking for explicit knowledge. Memory-based learners were told before the
final week of testing that exemplars were rule-governed before classifying. All
participants in each experimental condition were yoked in the final week.
As described, the testing condition extended over a 4-week period in the Mathews
study, measuring classification performance each week in all conditions. This method
provided an opportunity to track learning during training and testing over time, with the
additional manipulation of having yoked participants paired from week one in the rule-
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search condition. Taken together, these methods provided an “online” measure of the
effect of training, rather than to wait until training was completed by taking an “offline”
measure during testing. Changes in explicit knowledge were tracked with yoked
participants, as explicit knowledge accessible to instructors should be available to be
transferred to their yoked counter parts. The expected effect of instructional condition
and the availability of knowledge were both realized in the study (Table 1).
Condition
Memory-same set
Experimental
Week 4 Yoked
Memory-different set
Experimental
Week 4 Yoked
Rule-same set
Experimental
Week 1-3 Yoked
Week 4 Yoked
Rule-different
Experimental
Week 1-3 Yoked
Week 4 Yoked
Control-same set
Control different set

Week 1

Week 2

Week 3

Transfer Week 4

5.07
--

1.86
--

.82
--

2.22
5.36

6.32
--

5.18
--

4.96
--

3.04
5.32

6.82
8.82
--

3.14
6.25
--

2.14
5.21
--

3.03
3.46
5.57

7.14
8.75
-8.86
9.14

4.46
5.64
-8.86
9.82

3.75
5.71
-9.18
9.28

2.07
3.00
5.18
9.90
9.90

Table 1. The expected value of chance performance is 10 violations. All groups in the Mathews et al.
study displayed learning and transfer of learning. Yoked performance shows that some but not all of the
knowledge acquired in the intentional learning conditions is available for explicit description.

The teach-aloud procedure (Mathews et al., 1989) had participants periodically
stop while working on the primary task (e.g., trying to discriminate valid from invalid
grammar exemplars) to give verbal instructions for someone else (i.e., yoked participants)
to perform the task. The main advantage of the teach-aloud procedure is that the relative
level of performance of yoked participants versus their experimental partners provides a
direct measure of the extent to which knowledge of the grammar can be communicated
verbally to another person—a measure of their explicit knowledge of the grammar. If the
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verbal reports are obtained frequently enough, a satisfactory empirical account of
participants’ online awareness of their processing strategies during the task can be
obtained (Mathews et al., 1989). Yoked participants also provide a no-training condition,
which has been lacking in earlier studies and has been an issue of contention for some
researchers in the field (e.g., Redington and Chater, 1996). Yoke conditions were
employed that were very much in line with the Mathews study and are described in the
methods section.
The current research design varied in a number of ways from the Mathews study.
The familiarity condition in the current study served the exact same function as the
Mathews similarity condition. However, familiarity judgments were required instead of
similarity judgments because the latter might involve associations, which could
encourage explicit processing (Reber, 1993; Dienes & Scott, 2010). A two-alternative
forced choice (2-AFC) task replaced the 5-AFC used in the Mathews study. It has been
suggested that forcing participants to compare only two exemplars maximizes the
opportunity for participants to utilize chunk information (Shanks, Johnston, and Staggs,
1997). As the balanced chunk strength (BCS; described in detail below) design used in
the current study is employed to control directly the chunk information available to
participants, use of a 2-AFC task (instead of a 5-AFC) should provide for an even more
sensitive measure of BCS effects.
The nature of learning and knowledge in the incidental condition was not
measured over time in the Mathews study. The subjective measures in the current study
serve this very function. Also, the process of collecting online training and testing
measures is encouraged in recent literature (Haider, Eichler & Lange, 2010) as a way of
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accounting for methodological criticisms leveled at the validity and reliability of
measurements of consciousness in AGL transfer studies (Shanks and St. John, 1994). A
related issue has been recognized in that there are no assurances that knowledge
diagnosed during testing is the same knowledge that is used during training (Shanks, et
al., 1997). Subjective measures taken across all conditions will address this issue as well,
as performance measures should be sensitive enough to compare knowledge across
conditions. Additionally, there is no way of knowing whether participants in an
incidental learning condition switch to an explicit rule searching strategy, or that
participants in intentional learning conditions switch to attempting to discover the
underlying grammatical regularities (Haider, Eichler, & Lange, 2010). Online training
measures provide a solution to this issue by diagnosing knowledge used during training
over time, which can then be used to aid in determining if qualitative differences in
learning exist due to experimental manipulations. The indirect measures described
below served as the online measures taken during training/testing in the current study.
Online training measures can also serve as external criteria, which can be compared to
post-experimental knowledge test. This study employed a variation of the Process
Dissociation Procedure (PDP) as a post-experimental test of knowledge. If the same
theoretical construct is being measured (e.g., the cognitive unconscious), then measures
should relate to one another.
Balanced Chunk Strength (BCS) Design
It has been found that in most AGL studies, grammatical testing exemplars that
are randomly created from the AG have higher chunk strength (CS) than nongrammatical exemplars (Perruchet, 1994). In an early address of this issue, Reber and
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Allen (1978) asked participants to describe their learning experiences and how they
classified exemplars during testing (a measure of explicit knowledge). Responses
indicated a strong bias to use violations of bigram chunks, especially those chunks at the
beginning and end of exemplars. It was obvious that participant knowledge was chunkbased to some extent and that this knowledge was relied upon to determine
grammaticality during testing. Thus, CS-bias represents a confound (if it is determined to
be conscious) when attempting to establish an abstractionist account for performance in
AGL transfer studies (i.e., the superficial similarity between test and training items could
account for participants’ abilities to classify grammatical from non-grammatical
exemplars). Methods have since been introduced to address this issue directly.
Perruchet (1994) established evidence for this possible confound to abstractionist
representational knowledge by analyzing the training and testing exemplars used by
Brooks and Vokey (1991; Vokey and Brooks, 1992). This study addressed a related
confound, that between similarity and grammaticality of grammatical exemplars, i.e., the
similarity between training and test exemplars may effect classification performance, thus
confounding an abstractionist account of performance (also addressed with the BCS
design). Perruchet performed the following statistical analysis on the Brooks-Vokey
exemplars: The frequency of initial and terminal trigrams (and bigrams later in Exp. 4) in
each testing exemplar was measured across all training exemplars. These counts were
then summed and averaged for each testing string. For example, the test string MXRVM
begins with the MXR trigram and terminates with the RVM trigram. As was determined,
MXR occurred at the beginning of 5 of the total 16 training exemplars. The terminal
trigram RVM occurred 2 times in the training exemplars. The resulting equation (5 +

	
  

17	
  

	
  
2)/2 provides the CS of the MXRVM testing string, in this case, 3.5. The mean CS of
training and test exemplars are then compared across conditions (Table 3). Perruchet
determined that the Brooks and Vokey results could be accounted for by the repetition of
trigrams across training and testing exemplars.

Table 3. Pictured is the Perruchet (1994) analysis of Vokey & Brooks (1992) taken from Shanks et al.
(1997, p. 237, Table 5). Mean CS compared across conditions show the available tri- and bigram
information distinguishing grammatical and ungrammatical test exemplars. The percentages provided were
calculated by comparison to the maximum possible overlap where each training exemplar began and ended
with the same trigram and each testing exemplar shared the same beginning and ending trigram.

To address this confound, Knowlton and Squire (1996) used a BCS design in
which both grammatical and non-grammatical test exemplars have the same average CS.
This provides experimenters the opportunity to address effects of rule-based
representations that are available to participants during their classification task. The
addition of indirect measures will provide theoretically relevant insight into whether rulebased knowledge is conscious or unconscious. Moreover, if participants can classify
correctly when exemplars are grammatical but lack similarity to trained items (due to the
balancing of surface features bound to chunks), then an abstractionists account for the
classification can be advanced. The current study employed the BCS design provided by
Knowlton and Squire (1996) to quantify the similarity in surface structure (i.e., bigram
and trigram structure) between learning and testing exemplars used in the AGL study.
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The CS metric is computed by first determining all possible bigram and trigram chunks in
a test exemplar (e.g., the exemplar MTX would have a total of three bigram and trigram
chunks—MT, TX, MTX). This procedure is very similar to the Perruchet analysis
described. The difference is that Perruchet balanced beginning and terminating bi- and
trigrams (often referred to as salient features), whereas the Knowlton and Squire CS
metric balances all bi- and trigram chunks including those in the central part of exemplars
(referred to as non-salient features). Chunk strength with the CS metric is determined by
the average number times the chunks from a test exemplar appear over all training
exemplars. Through this method it can be established which test exemplars resemble
training exemplars the most (i.e., test exemplars with ‘high’ chunk strength). Knowlton
and Squire found eventually that chunk strength and rule-based knowledge contribute to
determining grammaticality. This joint contribution or mix of abstract and stimulusspecific knowledge is in line with interpretations from a number of other researchers
(e.g., Conway & Christiansen, 2006; Manza & Reber, 1997). It was hypothesized this
trend would be maintained in the current study, with participants displaying a mix of
explicit, stimulus-specific knowledge and implicit, unconscious knowledge in both the
intentional and incidental conditions (i.e., some chunk information will be present in all
exemplars even with the application of the BCS). Indirect measures are intended to
‘tease’ these contributions apart, which is one of the more theoretically interesting
contributions of this research. Another benefit of employing the BCS design is that it
has been used in imaging studies to show activation of distinct regions to abstract and
fragmentary knowledge (Lieberman et al., 2006).
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The Role of the Cognitive Unconscious in AGL
As has been established, AGL paradigms can be used to explore the enduring
questions of the role of consciousness in IL and cognition, and the extent that IL
processes involve working memory (i.e., the extent to which IL learning and the acquired
knowledge involve learning based on fragmentary chunks and whether they are
consciously accessible). Some of these questions are echoed in two concerns offered in
Manza and Reber (1997): (1) “can complex structural knowledge be acquired without
explicit awareness” or does consciousness invariably intrude, (2) can implicit and explicit
be “deeply dissociated” or do they represent variations of a single learning process
(Manza and Reber, 1997, p. 77)?
The association between IL and unconscious processing has been a central focus
of much IL research and has been the focus of considerable debate in the field (e.g.,
Dulany et al., 1984; Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990; Reber, 1967, 1989; Shanks & St. John,
1994). This assumption of unconscious processing was derived from results of early IL
studies (e.g., Reber, 1967; Reber and Allen, 1978), which found that human behavior
conformed to the rule-governed structure of the AG. Since these rules were not available
to consciousness, the concept of a cognitive unconscious was created to account for rule
extraction. The suggestion that IL leads to unconscious knowledge is still held today
(e.g., Dienes, 2008a).
Much of the early conceptual debate addressed the extent to which IL either
involved the acquisition of unconscious implicit knowledge or explicit knowledge that is
available to consciousness as fragmentary knowledge. These conceptual issues extended
the debate to methodological concerns. Key methodological concerns are whether
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research paradigms can be developed that convincingly and entirely dissociate
contributions of implicit and explicit knowledge acquired in IL studies. That is, can
distinct qualitative differences be established (Dienes, 2008a)? However, it has been
argued convincingly that it is very likely the case that both implicit and explicit processes
are involved in any learning and testing condition, and attempts to dissociate completely
are untenable, along with all attempts to establish such ‘process-purity’ (Reber, 1993;
Reingold and Merikle, 1988; Jacoby, 1991). This realization led to the application of
indirect measures that attempt to determine when conscious and unconscious processes
are used.
Indirect Measures of the Cognitive Unconscious
Indirect measures dissociate conscious and non-conscious influences on
performance and provide quantitative measures of unconscious influences (Jacoby, 1991;
Dienes and Berry, 1997). Without indirect measures, hypotheses suggesting that
unconscious abstract knowledge is acquired in an AGL task are left unsupported
(Redington and Chater, 1996). It has also been pointed out that transfer studies (e.g.,
Manza and Reber, 1997; Mathews et al., 1989) often lack indirect measures of
unconscious influences (Redington and Chater, 1996), and fewer still employ the
subjective measures to be used in the present research (Dienes, 2008a). It has been
suggested that more than one indirect measure should be used in research exploring the
cognitive unconscious (St. John & Shanks, 1997). The use of more than one indirect
measure addresses challenges to utilizing subjective measures, which caution against
relying on participants to make the final determination of what characterizes
consciousness (e.g., St. John & Shanks, 1997; Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993, 1997). The
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use of more than one indirect measure is also in line with the suggestion that, due to the
complexity of the phenomenon of consciousness, more than one form of measurement
should be employed (Seth, 2008). If measures used to test for unconscious and conscious
knowledge produce similar outcomes, one can more confidently assert that unconscious
knowledge is present.
Subjective Threshold Measures. Subjective measures of consciousness are
contrasted against the more traditional use of objective measures. To compare, the
objective threshold, as defined in cognitive psychology, is the point at which responses to
stimuli presented during a forced choice task reach chance level performance (Cheesman
and Merikle, 1984). The objective threshold has been the primary measure used in the
past to define the boundary between conscious and unconscious mental processing (e.g.,
Cheesman and Merikle, 1984), and is the favored measure by those most skeptical of
unconscious states (e.g., Shanks and St. John, 1994; Whittlesea and Dorken, 1993, 1997).
Subjective thresholds are a measure of an individual’s claimed awareness (Cheesman and
Merikle, 1984; Dienes, 2008). An unconscious distinction is made when participants
report that they are unaware of a stimulus, yet perform at better than chance levels on an
objective measure (Cheesman and Merikle, 1984).
As implicit learning is thought to develop specific unconscious knowledge, a
qualitative distinction can be established with the use of subjective measures (Dienes,
2008). Dienes (2008) offers that appropriate measures of unconscious knowledge need to
show two things: that the participant (a) has knowledge but (b) doesn’t know that she has
it. Building on Cheesman and Merikle’s (1984) application of subjective threshold
measures used in subliminal research, Dienes and colleagues have applied the measure in
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a variety of implicit learning paradigms (Dienes, et al., 1995; Dienes and Berry, 1997;
Dienes and Perner, 1998, Dienes, 2008). In these studies, perception is said to be below
the subjective threshold when target detection is above chance, but when participants say
they cannot detect the target; participants lack metaknowledge of the knowledge they are
using to perform at above chance levels (Dienes, 2008). Based on this application, two
criteria have been established to provide evidence of unconscious processing: the
guessing criterion and the zero correlation criterion. Both of these measures were
employed in the current research.
The guessing criterion is met when participant performance is above baseline,
even though participants claim to be guessing in their responses to target stimuli (e.g.,
Dienes, et al., 1995). The zero correlation criterion is met when participants’ confidence
measures of their own knowledge and their performance rates are not positively
correlated (e.g., performance is statistically above chance and participant confidence is
low; Dienes, 1995). Based on the results of the application of these two criteria, Dienes
(2008) claims that the criteria actually identify qualitatively different types of knowledge.
The basis for this claim rests on assumptions generated by theories of consciousness and
the logic proceeding from those assumptions in support of the metaknowledge construct.
Philosophical and Theoretical Assumptions Underlying Subjective Measures
There are assumptions that need to be accepted in order to support the validity of
subjective measures. In the subjective sense, the distinction between conscious and
unconscious is defined at the level at which an individual has access to knowledge or
‘knowing that you know’ (Rosenthal, 2005). This meta-knowledge sense of the
distinction addresses the phenomenology of individual knowledge (Shanks and St. John,
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1994), where consciousness represents knowledge that one is aware of and the
unconscious represents mental phenomena that an individual is ‘unaware of’ (Greenwald,
1992). This distinction employs the transitive use (which always takes an object, i.e.,
consciousness of something, e.g., “I know that I see a tree.”) of the term conscious in that
it refers to “conscious access to and/or conscious processing of a specific piece of
information,” rather than the intransitive use, which refers to the state of consciousness
(i.e., wakefulness or vigilance; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011, p. 201).
A philosophical basis for the use of subjective measures of mental states is
established in a hierarchical framework of first- and second-order mental states. Firstorder mental states are bound only to interactions with the world (e.g., the initial
activation of sensory mechanisms sensitive to motion in visual cortex to a moving
object). Second-order mental states are mental states about first-order mental states (e.g.,
knowing that one is seeing an object in motion). The rationale supporting this distinction
is exemplified further concerning blindsight patients, as provided in Dienes 2008a:
Blindsight patients, who have damage to an area of the
cortex called V1, can say whether an object is moving up or
down at above 80% accuracy. Yet they often claim not to
be seeing, often just to be purely guessing (Weiskrantz,
1997). Our strong intuition is to say the seeing is
unconscious precisely because the blindsight patient is not
aware of seeing; they do not have an accurate mental state
about the mental state of seeing. That is, it is because they
lack a second-order state (a mental state about a mental
state) that it seems right to say their seeing is unconscious
(p. 253).
This philosophical groundwork provides the basis for interesting theories of
consciousness, such as Baars’ Global Workspace Theory (GWT), which is a HigherOrder Thought (HOT) theory that binds metacognition to explicit knowledge (Baars,
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2002). This consideration directly affects how we interpret subjective measures of
mental states during AGL tasks3. According to Baars (1988), conscious knowledge of
something makes such knowledge “globally available,” meaning that the knowledge can
be combined with any other conscious knowledge. These combinations can be used to
make inferences and associations and drive explicit hypothesis testing strategies. Thus,
intentional learning conditions (i.e., rule-search conditions) should promote the use of
conscious knowledge. Alternatively, unconscious knowledge may be applied in a far
more specific way, such as to the detection of basic patterns (e.g., grammatical structure
in an AG exemplar). Specifically, if classification performance in incidental learning
conditions is statistically better than chance and subjective measures do not recognize
conscious knowledge, one can posit that the knowledge used to classify successfully is
not consciously available (i.e., it is unconscious). In sum, empirical evidence for the
unconscious cannot be established without implementing a theoretical construct of
consciousness (Dienes, 2008a). Both the guessing and zero-correlation criteria provide
some evidence for two qualitatively distinct processes that differ in functional ways
(Haider, Eichler & Lange, 2010). However, both criteria still rely on subjective reports,
so it has been suggested that such measures should be combined with other measurement
methods (Shanks and St. John, 1994). One additional method has already been
introduced—yoked conditions—which are used to measure explicit knowledge. Another
method is Jacoby’s PDP.
The Process-Dissociation Procedure (PDP).
According to the logic offered by the PDP, conscious and unconscious task
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
3

It should be mentioned (and as Dienes, 2008a points out) that even if one does not accept ‘high-order’
theories, determining if and when metaknowledge is available still has theoretical and applied value (Seth
et al., 2008).
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processing are qualitatively different things (Jacoby, 1994). Conscious knowledge
provides for goal-oriented behaviors that are able to be controlled voluntarily, whereas
unconscious knowledge is applied involuntarily (Jacoby, 1994; Destrebecqz and
Cleeremans, 2001; Fu, Fu, and Dienes, 2008). Estimates of conscious and unconscious
influences can be made by comparing performance on tasks where either both the
conscious and unconscious contribute to a task—the inclusion task—or are set in
opposition to each other—the exclusion task (Cleeremans et al., 1998). Examples of
these tasks are as follows. In an inclusion task participants are asked to generate a
sequence that most closely resembles the one upon which they were previously trained
(e.g., Buchner et al., 1998). During this task they can either rely on recollection, the
conscious knowledge (C), or they can guess based on unconscious knowledge (UC), such
as that based on intuition; both conscious and unconscious knowledge are operable and
work in unison (C+UC; Jacoby, 1991). In an exclusion task, participants are directed to
produce a sequence that is as different as possible from the training sequence (e.g.,
Buchner et al., 1998). Such a task sets unconscious and conscious influences in
opposition to each other because knowledge of the trained sequence is required in order
to produce novel sequences (Jacoby, 1991). If participants continue to generate the
trained sequences during the exclusion task, it is taken as evidence of the influence of U
(Jacoby, 1991). A measure of the influence of C can then be determined by computing
the difference in performance on the two tasks and a measure of U can be determined
based on how much performance on the exclusion task exceeds this baseline (Jacoby,
1991). In other words, participants either try to avoid applying knowledge (as in the
exclusion task) or try to apply all knowledge (as in the inclusion task); differences
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recorded between these two conditions indicate conscious knowledge, and use of
knowledge despite intentions indicates unconscious knowledge (Jacoby, 1991).
A variant of the PDP was used in a serial reaction time (SRT) IL task by
Destrebecqz and Cleeremans (2001, 2003). In these studies, stimuli were presented
sequentially (i.e., one stimulus on each trial) in one of four locations on a computer
screen. Participants were then asked to record the location of each stimulus by pressing a
button corresponding to each of the four locations. Unknown to the participants,
sequences were structured based on a rule-governed pattern (just as rules govern
grammatical structure in AGL exemplars). According to SRT logic, learning is
evidenced if participants press the correct button at faster and faster rates. In this case,
faster response rates when sequences followed the pattern compared to when they
violated it would indicate learning. This was found to be the case and the conscious
nature of this learning was then tested with a PDP variant. Participants were asked to
generate sequences in an inclusion task by being told to try to replicate as best as possible
the sequence they had learned during training. In the exclusion task, they were asked to
do just the opposite and try not to generate trained sequences. Participants were unable to
suppress knowledge in this condition and generated trained sequences at levels above
chance. This indicated a lack of control over the applied knowledge, suggesting that the
knowledge was unconscious according to PDP logic.
The current experiment used a modified version of Jacoby’s PDP task that is in line
with suggestions from investigators in the field of AGL (Shanks and St. John, 1994;
Wilkinson and Shanks, 2004; Dienes, 2008a). The recommended procedure is a string
completion task where exemplars are taken from trained exemplars. The inclusion
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portion of the task asks that participants attempt to replicate trained exemplars as best as
possible. Participants are advised to use any knowledge that they have gained, whether it
is knowledge that they know they know or just feel like they know. In the exclusion task,
they are asked to do the opposite and complete exemplars so that they are as dissimilar as
possible from trained exemplars. Grammatical exemplars created in the exclusion
condition represent a failure to suppress knowledge gained during training. This would
indicate that the knowledge applied is unconscious.
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EXPERIMENT
The following research design was roughly patterned against Mathews et al.,
(1989). Departures from the Mathews study include the following: (1) substituting the
memory-based instructions with “familiarize” instructions, (2) to apply subjective
measures during the training and testing conditions, (3) use of the PDP, and (4) a
balanced chunk strength manipulation. The grammar to be used is taken from Brooks
and Vokey, 1991. Exemplars from that grammar were balanced for chunk strength with
the Knowlton and Squire chunk metric (1996). Subjective measures were applied
according to Dienes (2008a). A modification to Jacoby’s PDP (1991) was used in
accordance with Shanks (2005) suggestions. With few exceptions, the proposed
analyses were similar to those used in the AGL studies from which each manipulation
was patterned.
Participants and Design.
The basic design of the current study is a 2 (rule-search v. familiarization
instructions) X 2 (BCS versus no-BCS) X 3 (Time) mixed model ANOVA. Power
analysis indicated an ideal n = 22 for each of the 12 groups (4 experimental, 4 single
week yoked, 2 fully yoked, 2 fully yoked controls). Due to attrition rates, the actual
numbers varied slightly across groups, with an eventual total of N = 223 participants.
Experimental participants were trained and then tested on the same day and time each
week, repeated over a three-week period (except for final-week yoked participants who
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tested only once). Fully yoked participants (i.e., three-week yoked) were paired with
each rule-search participant starting at week one and were only provided their paired
‘instructor’ descriptions to classify exemplars. Four single-day yoked groups were paired
with each experimental group on the final week.
There is some contention about whether control groups are necessary for each
experimental condition or whether performance can be compared against the chance
proportion of .50 (Perruchet, 1994). The contention is based on two concerns, the first of
which refers to learning that may be present during testing, which is encouraged in the
present design (and measured in the yoked conditions). The second is the possibility of a
chunk bias in grammatical exemplars, which is addressed by the BCS and is a principal
manipulation in the present design. For these reasons, classifications were compared
against chance performance in the main experimental conditions. However, control
groups were used in the three-week yoked conditions. Two control groups (one for the
BCS condition and one for the non-BCS condition) were used to compare performance in
the fully yoked condition (i.e., the rule-search yoked condition). These controls were
given only the instruction manipulation and were not provided descriptions or feedback.
Controls attempted to classify the same exemplars used by the rule-search group over the
3-week duration (i.e., the exemplars classified the first two weeks and then the letterswitched exemplars the third week), again, without training or feedback.
Participants were taken from the Psychology 201 participant pool. The following
method for participant selection was used to control for attrition rates, which are of
particular concern in the proposed study due to the time-series design and small number
of participants in each experimental group. A brief of the study was posted for
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Psychology 201 students on the announcement board on the first floor. The brief
described the study as simply “A 3-week Study of Consciousness” to avoid cues to the
learning aspects of the study, which may represent a confound for the incidental learning
conditions. It then directed those interested to contact the researcher for more
information. Those that did were informed that participation in the 3-week study would
fulfill the 5-hour research requirement for Psychology 201 (each day of participation
lasted about 30-45 minutes, depending on the assigned condition). It was hoped that this
process of first reading about the study and then inquiring further would establish a kind
of “tacit investment” by the prospective participants that would encourage motivation and
successful completion of the study. This, without actually stating that motivation is
required, which may represent (additional) bias in the random selection of participants
from the 201-subject pool. Despite this effort, a number of participants either did not
show up at their scheduled time or failed to successfully complete all three weeks of
testing. This resulted in unequal participant numbers in some conditions, but the
differences were not enough to adversely affect analyses.
Materials
The AG used in the present study is shown in Figure 3. Training and testing
exemplars were balanced for chunk strength and were similar to those used in Knowlton
and Squire (1996). Actual exemplars are shown in Appendix A. Twenty-three training
exemplars and 16 test exemplars between lengths 2-6 were generated from the AG.
Introducing an error in each of the 16 training exemplars created the non-grammatical
test strings. The original 16 testing exemplars were used in the non-BSC condition and
paired with 16 non-grammatical strings in the 2-AFC testing task. In the BSC condition,
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the exemplars were constructed such that chunk strength was equal across grammatical
and non-grammatical strings. Across all conditions, the16 pairs were presented twice in
random order for a total of 32 testing trials. Additionally, the AG selected to create
exemplars was, by comparison to other AG options, less complex. The same training and
testing exemplars were presented in pseudorandom-order each week (though were
switched to a different letterset on the final week), which should have made the learning
task easier across all conditions. These last two aspects of the experimental design were
employed in an effort to facilitate as much conscious learning as possible, particularly in
the rule-search non-BCS condition.

Figure 3. Grammar used by Knowlton and Squire (1996, Exp. 1).	
  

Training and Testing Protocol
The training protocol was as follows. Participants were presented with each
training exemplar for 5 s each. Training each week used the same set of training
exemplars presented in random order each week. Participants in the familiarization
conditions were asked to familiarize themselves with the training exemplars. Rule-search
participants were told that the exemplars were rule-governed and that they should attempt
to determine the nature of these rules.
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Testing began two minutes after training. Exemplars were presented in a 2-AFC
test, which presented one grammatical and one non-grammatical string side-by-side in the
center of the computer screen for each of 32 testing trials. Participants were not given
feedback on their performance, as it has been shown that feedback has little (e.g.,
Mathews et al., 1989) to no effect (e.g., Dienes, 2005). Feedback may also represent a
confound for the incidental learning conditions by implying consequences for ‘incorrect’
familiarity judgments. After each trial, participants were asked to provide a confidence
rating of their judgment (i.e., confidence in their judgment that their selection was either
grammatical or familiar) by selecting either 50 (completely guessing), 60, 70, 80, 90, or
100 (complete certainty). The only difference between groups were the directions, the
familiarity group was asked to select the exemplar that was most familiar, and the rulesearch group was asked to select the string that seemed to follow the grammatical rules
most closely. Confidence ratings represent an online training measure and also provide
for a comparison of performance over time.
After every 8 classifications, participants saw two different sets of instructions
presented on the computer screen. Participants in the rule-search condition were asked to
provide instructions for their yoked counterparts, which were written down on a sheet
provided to the participants (for a total of 4 different instructions). Participant instructors
were asked to describe as completely as possible exactly what they were doing to classify
the strings. On each subsequent set of directions, they were asked to provide as much
new information as possible. They were also informed that it was important to reference
letters and letter sequences as much as possible in their descriptions. The familiarization
groups were asked to reflect on the strings that they had found to be familiar for a total 20
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s (established based on an estimate of the time it took for instructors in the rule-search
groups to record their descriptions).
Yoked participants attempted to classify the exact same testing exemplars as
their yoked counterparts. Before classifying the first 8 strings, yoked participants were
given the instructions provided by instructors for their first 8 classifications only. Before
yoked classification on the next 8 trials, they were given instructions generated from only
trials 9-16 by the instructors, etcetera.
All participants were informed of the rule-governed structure used to generate the
exemplars immediately before training began in the third and final week. The letter set
was changed in the transfer task week from XVJT to BLFM. Participants in the rulesearch condition were reminded that in the first two weeks their task was to use some
form of strategy to try to learn the rules of the grammar. Participants in the
familiarization group were informed for the first time of the complex set of rules used to
generate the exemplars and were then asked to provide classification descriptions in the
same fashion as the rule-search groups. All participants were told that the letters used in
the first two weeks of the experiment were now switched to an entirely new set of letters,
but that the exemplars still followed the same set of simple grammatical rules used to
generate exemplars throughout the study. Participants were then trained on the new
exemplars and informed that they would be asked to select the grammatical string in a 2AFC task, as before. Participants were provided as much time as necessary to make
classifications throughout the study and the next pair was presented after a selection was
recorded on the computer keyboard.
All participants were given a PDP string completion task at the end of the final week of
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testing. The string completion test for the inclusion and exclusion tasks presented two
different sets of 16 grammatical exemplars previously used during the transfer condition
(the letter switch condition). Each string had either one or two letters removed across all
positions and replaced by a blank. 16 strings were presented in columns on two sheets of
paper, one for the inclusion task and one for the exclusion task. The letters available to
fill in the blanks were provided on each sheet along with the description of the task. In
the inclusion condition, participants were asked to generate grammatical sequences. In
the exclusion task, participants were asked to generate non-grammatical sequences. In
both conditions, participants were asked to complete the task by attempting to recall all
knowledge that they have acquired during training and testing, including knowledge that
they knew that they knew and knowledge that they just felt like they knew. In the
inclusion task, the knowledge was used to generate grammatical strings. In the exclusion
task, the same knowledge was to be recalled (or sensed) in order to create nongrammatical strings.
Predictions and Analyses
Again, Reber (1989, 1993) has argued that knowledge acquired during an AGL
task is both unconscious and not bound to specific perceptual features. However, if
perceptual features are what is being represented, they should be accessible declaratively,
representing a conscious form of knowledge. These perceptual features should be
flexibly applied to new exemplars leading to improvement over the three weeks of
training and testing in the non-BCS conditions. This knowledge should also transfer
fairly well in the transfer condition if it is not solely bound to the perceptual features of
the exemplars. Extended training may also develop unconscious abstract knowledge that
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facilitates transfer of learning during the third week across all 3-week conditions
(Johanson, 2009). As such, subjective measures should detect unconscious knowledge in
both instructional conditions, though it should be found at higher levels in the incidental
learning conditions. Fragmentary knowledge should be present in all conditions in some
form and especially prevalent in the non-BCS conditions due to the availability of chunk
information. Performance should improve on explicit tasks (yoked conditions) in the
intentional learning conditions. If the increased training leads to more abstract and
unconscious representations, transfer performance in the familiarization condition will be
better than in the rule-search condition.
Evidence for unconscious knowledge has also been associated with fewer errors
during classification as compared to an increased number of errors when knowledge is
conscious (Reber, 1989). This is because it is assumed that conscious knowledge is far
more flexible and can be applied to a variety of situations, where unconscious knowledge
is restricted to a particular simple pattern (Reber, 1989). This should lead to higher
performance scores in conditions where unconscious knowledge is being applied (i.e., the
incidental learning conditions).
Difference Scores for Zero Correlation and Guessing Criterion
The predictions for both the zero-correlation and guessing criteria are as follows.
It is hypothesized that knowledge in the familiarity conditions will be more unconscious
than that found in the rule-search conditions due to the instructional manipulation.
Knowledge in BCS conditions across conditions should tend to be more unconscious due
to the lack of chunk strength information available to make classifications. Alternatively,
knowledge in no-BCS conditions should be more conscious due to the availability of
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chunk information. The incidental BCS condition should show the best classification
performance when compared across conditions. The knowledge used to make
classifications in this condition is hypothesized to be unconscious due to the incidental
learning instructions. Based on this, the guessing criterion should measure high accuracy
and guessing, denoting unconscious knowledge based on this criterion. The incidental
no-BCS condition should have a similar measure, but may record fewer guesses when
grammatical strings are selected because of the availability of chunk information.
Whether this will be entirely accessible in the incidental condition is questionable, but
some chunk information will likely become conscious to participants. Intentional noBCS learning conditions should show good grammatical exemplar selection and low
guess selection, again displaying the conscious nature of the knowledge acquired in the
intentional condition. The BCS intentional condition should show low performance and
high guess rates representing a decrease in both conscious and unconscious knowledge
acquisition.
Yoked Conditions
Differences between classification performances, which typically show better
performance for instructors, should decrease with extended training with ‘abstract
instructions’ becoming more informative to yoked participants. All measures of
consciousness in yoked conditions should display a bias toward conscious knowledge, as
the only available information will be the instructions provided by the instructors.
However, it is possible that yoked participants could learn something on their own during
testing (Redington & Chater, 1996). The yoked control conditions are employed to
determine if this was the case. Yoked conditions address the important question of
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whether abstract knowledge can be verbalized. Reber (1989) says “no,” Mathews (1997)
says “yes.” Subjective measures applied to yoked participants addressed this issue. A
negative correlation between instructor and yoked subjective measures may be found due
to an increase in unconscious knowledge measured in instructors; as unconscious
knowledge increases, ability to verbalize would decrease (Reber, 1989) and ‘abstract
verbalizations’ would be less informative.
It was hypothesized that performance for single-week yoked conditions would be
poor but statistically above chance. Yoked participant performance in the non-BCS
conditions should be better than in the BCS conditions, again due to the availability of
chunk information that is accessible to instructors. Single-week yoke participants in the
incidental and intentional learning conditions should be similar, with a slight bias toward
better performance in intentional learning conditions (once again, due to chunk
information). Predictions for subjective measures applied to single-week yoked
participant are in line with 3-week yoked participants.
PDP across Conditions
A string-completion-task variation of the PDP measured the proportion of
grammatical strings created for the inclusion and exclusion conditions, which were
recorded for each experimental condition. According to PDP-logic, if participants have
perfect, conscious knowledge of the grammatical strings used during training and testing
in the transfer condition, then they should always create grammatical strings in the
inclusion condition and never in the exclusion condition. The equations applied to
describe performance in each condition were taken from Jacoby et al. (1993, p. 141).
The probability of completing a string to create a previously provided exemplar in the
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inclusion task is the probability of recollection (R) plus the probability of the string
coming to mind unintentionally (A) when there is a failure of recollection, A (1-R). This
represents a situation where all available knowledge is being applied. The inclusion task
can be represented formally as:

Inclusion = R + A(1-R).

In the exclusion task, strings are completed to create a previously studied grammatical
string only when it is unintentional (i.e., there is no conscious knowledge that the string
was presented during training or testing and participants incorrectly provide a
grammatical sequence). The exclusion task can be represented formally as:

Exclusion = A(1-R).

The probability of consciously remembering previous strings is estimated as the
probability of completing strings to create a grammatical string in the inclusion condition
minus the probability of creating grammatical strings in the exclusion condition:

R = Inclusion – Exclusion

Once a measure of conscious knowledge is established, the influence of unconscious
knowledge can be determined with the following equation:
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A = Exclusion/(1-R)

Once measures of conscious and unconscious knowledge are established, each
can serve as the dependent measures in analyses. Hypotheses were that the PDP should
diagnose differences in inclusion and exclusion tasks as a function of instruction type and
BCS. If unconscious knowledge increases, as we would expect in the incidental
conditions, then participants should find it more difficult to suppress unconscious
influences in the exclusion task, leading to an increase in the use of chunks that make
exemplars grammatical. It was hypothesized that inclusion task performance would be
good for both instruction groups due to increases in both unconscious and conscious
knowledge, but lower in BCS conditions due to the lack of available chunk information.
It was expected that intentional learning would be bound more to the physical
characteristics of the exemplars, thus more conscious in nature (Dienes, 2008a).
Importantly, chunk information was also available in the incidental learning conditions.
With this in mind, it was expected that performance in the inclusion task would be similar
in the no-BCS conditions; however, in the BCS conditions, participants in the incidental
learning conditions may show better performance due to having acquired some tacit
knowledge about the underlying structure of the grammar. If this was found to be the
case, performance on the exclusion task should reveal an inability to suppress
unconscious knowledge leading to the creation of (unintended) grammatical strings.
Yoked participant performance on the PDP should suggest that knowledge acquired in
these conditions is primarily conscious.
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Analyses across all measures followed the same general format. Analysis of the
four main experimental groups employed a 2 (BCS v. no-BCS) X 2 (Familiarize v. RuleSearch) X 3 (Time) mixed model ANOVA. To analyze the effects across the rule-search
groups and their yoked counterparts, I applied a 2 (BCS v. no-BCS) X 2 (Instructor v.
Yoke) X 3 (Time) mixed model ANOVA. A 2 (Instructor v. Yoke) X 2 (Familiarity v.
Rule-Search) X 2(BCS v. non-BCS) ANOVA was applied to all group classification
performance on the third week.
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RESULTS
Classification as a function of type of instruction, BCS, and time.
Classification rates were used as the dependent measure across the instruction,
BCS, yoked, transfer (i.e., a switch to a different letter set), and time-series conditions
(Table 2). Passive abstraction, accessibility of knowledge, and abstractness of knowledge
are all properties of IL that can be tested by this design (Mathews, et al., 1989). Passive
abstraction is evidenced by the instruction manipulation if the knowledge acquired is
equivalent across passive and intentional conditions. The yoked conditions are used to
test the accessibility of knowledge—if yoked performance is lower than their yoked
counterparts, knowledge used by the ‘instructors’ to classify exemplars is not available to
be described accurately and is thus considered to be tacit. Abstractness of knowledge is
tested in the transfer conditions, finding support if performance levels are maintained
despite a switch in the perceptual features of the exemplars (i.e., a change in letter set) on
the third week.
The main experimental manipulation of instruction—rule-search/intentional
versus familiarity/passive—was used to establish explicit and implicit learning
conditions, respectively. The BCS (balanced and non-balanced chunk strength across
exemplars presented in the 2-AFC task) manipulation was meant to control for
classification bias bound to perceptual features of grammar (bi- and trigram information).
It was hypothesized that balancing chunk strength would have a greater affect on the rule-
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search conditions, as it was assumed that chunks would be the most available form of
information to use while actively attempting to consciously decipher the underlying
grammatical structure. We will first look at the effect of the two main experimental
manipulations of instruction and BCS.
Mean Percent Correct Classifications as a Function of BCS, Instruction,
And Week of Practice of Experimental and Yoked Participants
Condition

Week 1

Week 2

Transfer Week 3

Familiarity BCS
Experimental
60(11)
58(10)
62(10)
3-week Yoked
---1-week Yoked
55(10)
Familiarity no-BCS
Experimental
62(9)
66(14)
65(13)
3-week Yoked
---1-week Yoked
54(10)
Rule-search BCS
Experimental
60(15)
55(12)
57(12)
3-week Yoked
51(10)
46(12)
53(11)
1-week Yoked
--51(10)
Rule-search no-BCS
Experimental
61(15)
61(7)
59(11)
3-week Yoked
50(13)
57(12)
54(10)
1-week Yoked
--53(10)
Control 3-week Yoked BCS
51(11)
50(10)
44(16)
Control 3-week Yoked no-BCS
50(3)
53(9)
49(15)
Control 1-week Yoked
50
Table 2. Mean percent of correct classifications as a function of BCS, instructional condition, and week of
practice for experimental, three-week yoked, and single-week yoked groups. SD is provided
parenthetically.

Effect of Instruction and BCS
Mixed-model analysis with BCS and instruction as the between-subjects factors
and week of testing as the within-subjects factor of classification rates across the main
experimental conditions revealed a marginally significant main effect of BCS, F(1,69) =
3.45, p = .068, ηp2 = .049, with classification performance being higher in the non-BCS
conditions (M = 68%, SD = 13) when compared against the BCS conditions (M = 63%,
SD = 11). All other comparison failed to reach significance. Balancing the chunk
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strength should have had more of an effect on the rule-search conditions. However, an
additional planned comparison suggested that balancing the chunk strength had more of
an effect on passive learning group classification performance, F(1,67) = 3.03, p = .087,
ηp2 = .043 (M = 69%, SD = 12 in the non-BCS condition versus M = 62%, SD = 9 in the
BCS condition), than on the intentional learning groups, F(1,67) = .80, p = .38, ηp2 = .012
(M = 63%, SE = 11 in the non-BCS condition versus M = 60%, SD = 12 in the BCS
condition), though the effect was marginal. It was also hypothesized that the rule-search
groups would outperform familiarity groups, in general. Another planned comparison
revealed that performance for each of the instructional groups was fairly equal over the
first two weeks; however, the passive instruction groups outperformed the intentional
instruction groups on the third week, F(1,67) = 3.80, p = .055, ηp2 = .054 (M = 63%, SD =
12 for the passive groups versus M = 57%, SD = 12 for the intentional groups).
Taken together, the expected effect of balancing the exemplar chunk strength was
realized, however, the passive groups were affected more than the intentional learning
groups. This suggests that despite not being instructed to focus on detecting the
grammatical rules, the passive instruction groups were relying on the available bi- and
trigram information to some extent while developing their superior knowledge of the
grammar. The extent to which this knowledge was conscious or unconscious will be
considered when we look at the data from the subjective measures.
Passive Abstraction
If classification rates are roughly equivalent across the instruction conditions (and
are above chance), then it can be suggested that a degree of tacit knowledge was acquired
implicitly in the passive learning conditions. An independent-samples t-test was
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conducted to compare the classification rates across the instructional conditions. There
was no significant difference in the scores for familiarity (M = 68%, SD =12) and rulesearch (M = 64%, SD = 12%) conditions, t(69) = -1.49, p = .14, which was not surprising
considering that this has been found repeatedly in past experiments (e.g., Reber, 1976,
see Reber, 1989 for a review). Familiarity-instruction groups acquired as much (or more)
knowledge of the grammar as did the rule-search groups. Specifically, in accordance with
the assumptions of the instruction manipulation, the results suggest that the tacit
knowledge that was acquired in the passive instruction groups was roughly equivalent to
the knowledge that was acquired in the rule-search groups, which is assumed to be more
conscious in nature. However, the conscious nature of the knowledge acquired by the
rule-search groups is brought into question when we look at performance from yoked
participants.
Accessibility of Knowledge
A mixed-model ANOVA with BCS and Yoke as between-group variables and
week of practice as the within-group variable on the rule-search groups and their yoked
counterparts (including controls), revealed an interaction between classification scores
and BCS, F(2,204) = 2.97, p = .05, ηp2 = .03. Pairwise comparisons revealed that
performance of the yoked controls was statically higher in the non-BCS condition (M =
53%, SD = 9) than the BCS condition (M = 50%, SD = 10) during the second week.
Neither score was statistically different than zero, so the effect was not remarkable. A
between subjects effect also indicated a difference in scores between rule-search groups
and their yoked counterparts and controls, F(2,102) = 11.50, p < .001, ηp2 = .18. All other
comparisons were non-significant, though a main effect of BCS was again found to be
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marginal, F (1,102) = 3.14, p = .08, ηp2 = .03 and in the expected direction (M = 59%, SD
= 12 for non-BCS and M = 56%, SD = 11 for BCS). A post hoc Tukey test showed that
the rule-search groups differed significantly from both their yoked counterparts (p < .001)
and controls (p = .001); however, yoked group performance did not differ significantly
from controls. This provides conclusive evidence that the rule-search groups failed to
describe accurately to their yoked counterparts the knowledge they were using to make
their classifications. The conclusion that can be drawn from these particular findings is
that participants in the rule-search conditions did not have conscious knowledge of the
information they were using to make their classifications, which suggests that it is
unconscious to some degree.
One-sample t-tests were conducted to compare classification performance of the
controls against a 50% chance rate. There was no significant difference in control
classification rates (M = 50%, SD = 8) from chance, t(29) = -.06, p = .95. These results
suggest performance in BCS and non-BCS conditions under familiarity and rule-search
instructions can just as accurately be compared against chance performance.
Specifically, no statistically distinguishable tacit knowledge was acquired by the control
groups, which if found, would have needed to be considered when accounting for
learning in the three-week yoked conditions.
There is, however, an important consideration regarding the accuracy of the
descriptions provided. This consideration does not challenge the presence of tacit
knowledge in the rule-search conditions, but may account for some of the performance of
their yoked counterparts. The accuracy of the information provided to yoked participants
is provided in Table 3.
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Percent of Correct Information in Description
Condition

Week 1

Week 2

Transfer Week 3

Familiarity BCS

--

--

35

Familiarity no-BCS

--

--

20

Rule-search BCS

30

14

33

Rule-search no-BCS

20

25

33

Table 3. Average amount of correct information in descriptions provided by instructors to their yoked
counterparts. Correct information was coded based on accurate references to either bi- or trigrams, or to
salient features (i.e., letters at the beginning and end of exemplars).

Correct information was coded based on accurate references to either bi- or trigrams, or
to salient features (i.e., letters at the beginning and end of exemplars). This information
was then divided by the sum of all such information made available in the descriptions.
As can be seen, instructors across all conditions displayed limited abilities to accurately
describe relevant information about the grammatical structure. This suggests that their
knowledge is more tacit in nature.
A 2 (Instructor v. Yoke) X 2 (Familiarity v. Rule-Search) X 2(BCS v. non-BCS)
ANOVA was applied to all group classification performance on the third week. This
analysis revealed a main effect for instruction, F(1,211) = 4.25, p = .04, ηp2 = .02 and
yoke, F(3,211) = 8.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. All other main effects and interactions failed
to reach significance. The effect of instruction indicated that the passive instruction
groups classified more exemplars correctly than did the rule-search search groups (M =
69%, SD = 12 versus M = 55%, SD = 11, respectively).

A post hoc Tukey analysis of

the yoked conditions showed a significant difference between instructor (M = 61%, SD =
12) and their one-week yoked counterparts (M = 53%, SD = 10), again indicating that
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knowledge used by the instructors to classify exemplars is not available to be explicitly
and accurately described, thus unconscious.
Abstractness of Tacit Knowledge
The abstractness of tacit knowledge was tested with a transfer task between the
second and third weeks. A mixed-model analysis with BCS and instruction as betweensubjects factors and week of testing as the within-subjects factor of classification rates
across the main experimental conditions revealed no significant within-group differences
across performance during the last two weeks, F(1,67) = .310, p = .58, ηp2 = .01 (second
week, M = 60%, SD = 15 and third week, M = 60%, SD = 17). These results indicate that
knowledge did transfer to the letter-switch exemplars. Specifically, these results suggest
that the knowledge used to classify exemplars during the third week is, to some degree,
abstract. However, there were between-group main effects for BCS, F(1,67) = 5.48, p =
.02, ηp2 = .076, and instruction, F(1,67) = 5.10, p = .03, ηp2 = .071, which indicated better
performance in both the non-BCS conditions and in the incidental learning conditions.
The better performance in the non-BCS conditions has been addressed previously and is
the expected effect of making bi- and trigram information available to assist
classifications. The better performance in the incidental learning conditions may suggest
the combined effects of both conscious and unconscious learning. Further evidence for
this possibility is revealed in the analyses of data from the subjective measures.
A separate mixed-model analysis with BCS as the between groups factor and
Time as the within-groups factor on three-week yoke performance did reveal a withinsubjects interaction effect of Session and BCS, F(1,77) = 4.46, p = .04, ηp2 = .06.
Classification scores in the non-BCS condition decreased from week two (M = 58%, SD
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= 12) to week three (M = 54%, SD = 11), and the opposite was the case in the BCS
condition (M =46%, SD = 12 and M = 53%, SE = 11, respectively). Both conditions
seem to have transferred knowledge from the second to third week indicating the presents
of abstract knowledge. The decreased performance in the non-BCS condition suggests
that performance was more directly related to the perceptual features of the exemplars
and thus more conscious in nature. Specifically, instructors seem to have been able to
transfer some knowledge about the chunks to their yoked counterparts. The increase in
performance found in the BCS condition suggests that the knowledge applied in the third
week was more abstract and tacit in nature. Performance was, however, not statistically
different from chance. It is likely that any knowledge present during the third week in
the BCS condition was acquired on that week alone.
The combined results of analyses of the classifications scores suggest that the
knowledge used to classify exemplars is to some extent abstract and is acquired
implicitly. The results also indicate that the knowledge is largely tacit. These findings
are in-line with suggestions that knowledge acquired during an AGL is both unconscious
and not bound entirely to specific perceptual features (Reber, 1989, 1993). There is some
indication that perceptual features were being learned and were available for description
across all conditions, especially in the rule-search non-BCS condition. However, in
general, there was little evidence of conscious knowledge indicated by the analysis of
yoked performance, which was far lower than was reported by Mathews. It is possible
that the additional training provided in that study lead to the increase in explicit
knowledge about the underlying grammar. Knowledge across all groups transferred to
week three, which provides additional evidence of the abstract representational form and
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tacit nature of the knowledge found predominantly across groups. We will now move to
the analyses of the subjective measures and PDP post-test to determine if their results
confirm the general unconscious nature of this knowledge.
Subjective Measures of Consciousness
Subjective measures have been developed to determine if knowledge acquired
under AGL conditions is either conscious or unconscious or some combination thereof.
The zero-correlation criterion tests whether subjective confidence ratings relate to
performance. If participants classification rates and confidence ratings relate, it is
assumed that their high confidence is due to being aware of the knowledge they are using
to make correct classifications. Conversely, if they do not relate, it is assumed that
participants are not aware of the knowledge that they are using to make correct
classifications and is unconscious. The Chan Difference Score is the difference in
confidence ratings when correct and incorrect and is one of the dependant measures that
can be use to quantify this difference. Within-subjects effects are of particular relevance
to the zero-correlation criterion, as a single score taken from each participant may not
detect variations in confidence ratings offered throughout testing (Dienes, 2005). If
participants are just as confident when they are correct as when they are incorrect, they
would receive a score of zero denoting a complete lack of metaknowledge. The guessing
criterion is the total percentage of correctly classified letter strings while guessing (i.e.,
participants record a confidence rating of 50%), which used the total number of guesses
as the baseline. Higher scores indicate more unconscious knowledge in accordance with
this measure. Results of the subjective measures are provided below (Table 4).
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Percent Confidence Ratings when Classifying Correctly and Incorrectly, Chan Difference Scores, and
Guessing across BCS, Instruction, and Week Performance of Experimental and Yoked Participants
Chan Difference
Guessing
Condition
Wk 1
Wk 2 Wk3
Wk 1
Wk 2
Wk 3
Familiarity BCS
Experimental
2(5)** 3(6)** 2(3)**
66(17)
69(14) 78(24)
3-week Yoked
------1-week Yoked
--2(3)*
--68(7)
Familiarity no-BCS
Experimental
2(2)** 3(3)** 2(3) **
61(16)
73(19) 50(22)
3-week Yoked
------1-week Yoked
--2(2) m
--84(9)
Rule-search BCS
Experimental
2(3)*
1(3)
1(2)*
75(11)
71(11) 50(15)
3-week Yoked






1-week Yoked
--
--
Rule-search no-BCS
Experimental
3(4)*
2(3)** 4(4)**
80(17) 70(10) 76(19)
3-week Yoked

1(2)* 2(2) m

79(6)
84(8)
1-week Yoked
--
--
Cont 3-week Y BCS






Cont 3-week Y no-BCS






Cont 1-week
Table 4. The Chan Difference Score is the difference in average confidence between correct and incorrect
classifications. A maximum score of 50 denotes complete metaknowledge and 0 denotes complete tacit
knowledge. The Guessing Criterion is the total percentage of correctly classified letter strings while
guessing, which uses the total number of guesses as the baseline. Scores range from 50 to a maximum of
100, 50 represents no unconscious knowledge 100 denotes complete unconscious knowledge according to
this measure. SD is provided parenthetically. m = marginally significant (p < .08), * = p < .05, ** = p < .01
Significance indicates presence of metaknowledge according to the zero-correlation criterion and the
presence of tacit knowledge according to the guessing criterion.  = no score due to classification
performance failing to be statistically distinguished from chance.

Chan Difference Scores
Mixed-model analysis with BCS and instruction as the between-subjects factors
and week of testing as the within-subjects factor on Chan difference scores of the main
experimental groups revealed no significant within-subject effects, F(2,134) = .49, p =
.61. t-tests were used to compare group performance over the three weeks against zero.
The familiarity/BCS group scores were significantly different from zero each week, t(17)
= 3.20, p < .01, t(17) = 4.00, p < .01, and t(17) = 2.90, p = .01, respectively. This was also
the case for the familiarity/non-BCS group scores each of the three weeks, t(17) = 3.34, p
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< .01, t(17) = 5.69, p < .01, and t(17) = 3.45, p < .01, respectively. Rule-search/BCS
scores during the second week were not significantly different from zero, t(17) = 1.64, p
= .12, indicating a lack of metaknowledge, but first and third week performance did differ
significantly from zero, t(17) = 2.57, p = .02 and t(17) = 2.34, p = .03. Group scores for
the rule-search/non-BCS condition each week also were statically distinguished from
zero, t(16) = 2.41, p = .03, t(16) = 2.88, p = .01, and t(16) = 3.56, p < .01, respectively.
The results suggest that metaknowledge was present across all of the main experimental
groups each week, except for the second week in the rule-search/BCS condition. The
presence of metaknowledge in main experimental passive learning groups may seem to
contradict the assumptions of the instruction manipulation—that passive group
knowledge should be predominantly tacit. Equally, the presence of metaknowledge in
the third week may seem to contradict an (implied) assumption of the transfer
condition—that since knowledge is more abstract in form, it is more unconscious in
nature.

We will address this in the general discussion.
Yoked performance in the BCS rule-search conditions did not exceed chance

level classification performance, so could not be analyzed. The same was true for the 3week control conditions and first week of performance in the non-BCS condition. A
mixed-model ANOVA with Instructor (Instructor v. Yoke) as the between-group variable
and week of practice as the within-group variable on the non-BCS rule-search group and
their yoked counterparts over the last two weeks revealed no significant within-subjects
interaction effects for difference scores and instructor condition, F(1,40) = 1.80, p = .19.
However, there was a between-groups effect of instructor, F(1,40) = 5.39, p = .03, ηp2 =
.12, which indicated that instructors (M = 2.70, SE = .50) possessed more metaknowledge
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over these two weeks than yokes (M = 1.19, SE = .41). t-tests on the second and third
week non-BCS three-week yoke conditions revealed a significant difference from zero
the second week, t(24) = 2.36, p = .03, and a marginally significant difference on the
third week, t(24) = 1.93, p = .07. These were the only three-week yoked groups that
indicated any metaknowledge. These findings express the expected affect of BCS on the
rule-search instructors. When chunk information was available, the instructions offered
to yoke counterparts improved their classification performance to levels above chance.
The metaknowledge indicated in these yoked conditions is likely bound to the explicitly
described chunk information. The lack of metaknowledge during the first yoked week
performance may be due to the instructors’ lack of practice in providing descriptions. It
could also be due to the unconscious nature of the knowledge acquired by instructors to
classify exemplars.
A 2 (Instructor v. Yoke) X 2(BCS v. non-BCS) ANOVA was applied to passive
group instructors and their one-week yoked counterparts on third week Chan Difference
(again, rule-search groups could not be analyzed due to chance classification
performance). No significance was indicated between instruction and BCS, F(1,76) =
.09, p = .76, which suggests that metaknowledge is roughly equivalent across these
conditions. t-tests were performed only for the passive one-week yoked groups because
their classification performance exceeded chance—BCS, t(17) = 2.15, p = .05 and nonBCS, t(21) = 1.86, p = .077. No knowledge of the grammar (meta or tacit) was indicated
in the rule-search one-week yoked conditions. The indication of tacit knowledge in the
passive groups suggests that instructors in these groups were none-the-less able to share
some aspects of their knowledge, as well. This was not the case for the rule-search
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participants, except in the three-week non-BCS yoked condition. However, it is possible
the yoked performance across all yoked conditions was due to the yoked participants’
own acquisition of tacit knowledge of the grammar. Tacit knowledge in the one-week
yoked passive groups may not be as likely due to the lack of practice; thus, it is more
likely that their knowledge is more conscious in nature. Specifically, this suggests that
the passive yoked groups’ metaknowledge is bound to the knowledge they received from
instructor descriptions. However, when we consider the accuracy of the descriptions
provided by the passive groups instructors in the BCS (35% correct) and non-BCS (20%
correct), this may not seem likely. This suggests that the metaknowledge present in this
group was acquired, at least in part, by interacting with the exemplars alone.
Guessing Criterion
Mixed-model analysis with BCS and instruction as the between-subjects factors
and week of testing as the within-subjects factor on guess rates across the main
experimental conditions revealed no significant within- or between-subjects effects. The
average group scores for weeks 1-3 were M = 81, SD = 20; M = 68, SD = 11; and M = 72,
SD = 21, respectively. This indicated the presence of tacit knowledge in all of the main
experimental groups. As to whether the chance level performance of yoked counterparts
in the rule-search groups was due, in part, to the tacit nature of instructor knowledge, a 2
(Instruction) X 2 (BCS) ANOVA was performed. This analysis revealed a marginal
effect of instruction, F(1,25) = 3.53, p = .07, ηp2 = .12, indicating more tacit knowledge in
the rule-search groups (M = 78, SD = 15) than in the passive groups (M = 65, SD = 16).
It is thus possible that the poor classification performance in the yoked conditions was
due to the tacit nature of the instructor knowledge. The average accuracy of the
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descriptions offered by the rule-search groups also supports this (M = 35%). Analysis of
second week scores revealed no significant differences, F(3,19) = .08, p = .97. Third
week analysis similarly showed no significant differences across groups, F(3,18) = .84, p
= .49 (average M = 74, SD = 20). Tacit knowledge was only marginally indicated in the
familiarity no-BCS, t(14) = 1.92, p = .08, and failed to be indicated in the rule-search
BCS condition. The lack of tacit knowledge in these conditions seems to partially
contradict the assumptions of the BCS manipulation (more metaknowledge in the nonBCS conditions and more tacit knowledge in the BCS conditions). The Chan difference
score for the rule-search BCS group does indicate some metaknowledge, but the poor
classification performance of their three- and one-week yoked counterparts (M = 53, SD
= 11 and M = 51, SD = 10, which failed to be distinguished from chance level
performance) suggests that the amount of metaknowledge is low. All knowledge for this
group transferred from weeks two (M = 55, SD = 12) to three (M = 57, SD = 12), so was
abstract in nature according to the assumptions of the transfer condition. It may also be
unconscious by the same assumptions, which should have been represented by a higher
guessing criterion score. One reason that the guessing criterion failed to recognize this
tacit knowledge may be due to the low level of guesses in this condition. There were
only two confidence ratings of 50% recorded, one for an incorrect response and one for a
correct response. This may be a delimiting factor in the application of this criterion.
A 2 (Instructor v. Yoke) X 2 (BCS v. non-BCS) ANOVA was applied to passive
group instructors and their one-week yoked counterparts on the third week guess rates
(rule-search groups could not be analyzed due to chance classification performance). No
significant differences were found between participant condition and BCS, F(1,14) =
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3.11, p = .10, ηp2 = .03. t-tests were performed only for the passive one-week yoked
groups because their classification performance exceeded chance—BCS, t(17) = 2.15, p
= .05 and non-BCS, t(21) = 1.86, p = .08. Tacit knowledge was thus indicated in both
passive yoked conditions.
A summary of the results of the subjective measures reveal a few interesting
trends, each of which only partially coincides with original predictions. It was predicted
that knowledge would be more tacit in nature in the passive instruction groups and more
conscious in nature in the intentional instruction groups. However, metaknowledge was
indicated across all conditions and across all weeks of testing, which when considered in
light of performance in the yoked conditions, draws into question the explicit nature of
metaknowledge. Tacit knowledge was also indicated across all groups and was
especially prevalent in the rule-search non-BCS condition, where it was least expected to
be found. It was also predicted that knowledge in the BCS conditions would be more
tacit in nature and that metaknowledge would be more prevalent in the non-BCS
conditions. Again, this seems to be only partially confirmed by the performance in the
passive no-BCS condition. It was predicted that familiarity groups would have the best
overall classification performance, yet, the best performance was predicted to be in the
familiarity-BCS group, but was eventually indicated in the familiarity no-BCS condition.
The suggestion across all findings is that the metaknowledge may be characterized by
something other than an explicit understanding of the perceptual features and
grammatical structure.
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Process Dissociation Procedure
According to PDP-logic, if participants possess perfect metaknowledge of the
grammatical structure they will create grammatical strings in the inclusion task and never
in the exclusion task. It was predicted that conscious knowledge would be indicated by
the inclusion task across all groups due to increases in both conscious and unconscious
knowledge of the grammar, but lower in the BCS conditions. It was also predicted that
tacit knowledge would be more prevalent in the familiarity and BCS conditions, which
should lead to higher scores in the exclusion task. Results for the PDP are provided in
Table 5.
Process Dissociation Procedure measures of
Conscious (Inclusion Task) and Unconscious (Exclusion Task) Influences
As a Function of BCS, Instruction, and Yoked Conditions
Condition

Inclusion

Exclusion

Familiarity BCS
Experimental
.02(.21)
.27(.16)
3-week Yoked
--1-week Yoked
.24(.26)
.16(.13)
Familiarity no-BCS
Experimental
.04(.13)
.29(.09)
3-week Yoked
--1-week Yoked
.16(.21)
.18(.11)
Rule-search BCS
Experimental
.09(.14)
.38(.17)
3-week Yoked
.01(.17)
.38(.08)
1-week Yoked
.08(.20)
.21(.08)
Rule-search no-BCS
Experimental
.21(.28)
.27(.18)
3-week Yoked
.17(.14)
.26(.14)
1-week Yoked
.03(.14)
.21(.13)
Cont 3-week Y BCS
.00(.12)
.19(.14)
Cont 3-week Y no-BCS
.00(.08)
.21(.18)
Cont 1-week Yoked
0
0
Table 5. The Process Dissociation Procedure provides a measure of conscious (C) and unconscious (UC)
knowledge of letter sequences that create grammatical strings. Standard errors are provided parenthetically	
  

Mixed-model analysis with BCS (BCS v. non-BCS) and Instruction (Rule-Search
v. Familiarity) as the between-subjects factors and Test (inclusion and exclusion) as the
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within-subjects factors across the main experimental conditions revealed a main effect for
type of test, [F(1,67) = 38.29, p < .01, ηp2 = .36] and instruction [F(1,67) = 9.34, p < .01,
ηp2 = .12]. BCS failed to reach significance. As shown by a planned comparison on
performance in the inclusion task, F(1,69) = 6.06, p = .02, the rule-search groups
possessed more conscious knowledge when compared to the familiarity groups. In-fact,
familiarity group performance did not vary significantly from baseline (0 grammatical
strings created), t(35) = 1.07, p = .29, suggesting the almost complete lack of conscious
knowledge in accordance with this measure. A planned comparison on performance on
the exclusion task indicated that tacit knowledge was statically equal across both
instruction conditions, F(1,69) = 1.43, p = .24. Both groups recorded levels of tacit
knowledge that were well above baseline [t(35) = 10.35, p < .01 and t(35) = 12.22, p <
.01, for rule-search and familiarity groups, respectively]. These results appear to indicate
that the acquisition of conscious knowledge was restricted to the rule-search conditions
and that both conditions acquired some tacit knowledge of the grammar.
Mixed-model analysis with BCS (BCS v. non-BCS) and Yoke (Instructor v.
Yokes) as the between-subjects factors and Test (inclusion and exclusion) as the withinsubjects factors across the rule-search groups and their three-week yoked counterparts
(excluding controls) revealed an interaction between Test and BCS, F(1,75) = 17.35, p <
.05, ηp2 = .18. Pairwise comparisons indicated that there was a statically significant (p <
.01) difference in test scores for the BCS conditions (inclusion M = .05, SE = .04,
exclusion M = .38, SE =.04), but only marginal significance (p = .08) in the non-BCS
conditions (inclusion M = .19, SE = .03, exclusion M = .26, SE =.02). The decrease in
metaknowledge in the BCS condition is, once again, the expected effect of reducing the
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availability of chunk information. These results also indicate the prevalence of tacit
knowledge across groups, which is in line with the results from the subjective measures.
Mixed-model analysis with BCS (BCS v. non-BCS), Instruction (Rule-search v.
Familiarity) and Instructor (Instructors v. Yoke) as the between-subjects factors and Test
(inclusion and exclusion) as the within-subjects factors across the main experimental
groups and their one-week yoked counterparts revealed two three-way interactions.
There was an interaction between Instruction, Instructor, and Test type, F(1,142) = 7.49,
p = .01, ηp2 = .05, and one between-subjects interaction between BCS, Instructor, and
Test type, F(1,142) = 3.74, p = .06, ηp2 = .03. These three-way interactions were
supported only by one two-way interaction between Instructor and Test type. For this
reason, I split the data along the Instructor condition and did separate analyses, one on the
four instructor conditions and one on their one-week yoked counterparts. The 2 (Rulesearch v. Familiarity) X 2 (BCS v. non-BCS) X 2 (Inclusion v. Exclusion) mixed-model
analysis across the main experimental groups was performed previously. The results of
this analysis are at the beginning of this section. Those results did not indicate any
interactions, so it was expected that the same analysis on the one-week yoked groups
would reveal an interaction. This was in fact the case with an interaction being found
between Instructions and Test type, F(1,75) = 7.73, p = .01, ηp2 = .09. Pairwise
comparisons indicated that there was a statistically significant (p < .01) difference in test
scores for the rule-search conditions (inclusion M = .05, SE = .03, exclusion M = .21, SE
=.01), but no such difference found in the familiarity groups (p = .59; inclusion M = .20,
SE = .03, exclusion M = .17, SE =.02). These results suggest that familiarity groups had
more total knowledge (metaknowledge and tacit knowledge) when classifying exemplars.
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This should be evidenced by better classification rates when compared against the rulesearch groups. However, analysis of one-week yoke classification performance collapsed
across BCS conditions failed to support this, F(1,78) = .91, p = .34, though scores did
seem to suggest this expected effect (rule-search M = 56%, SD = 12; familiarity M =
58%, SD =.12).
Subjective Measures on the Process Dissociation Procedure
Confidence ratings were recorded for each response on both tests of the PDP. To
my knowledge, subjective measures have not been used in such an application. It was
predicted that there should be a relationship between the scores used to indicate
metaknowledge (the zero-correlation criterion and inclusion task), as well as a
relationship between those used to indicate tacit knowledge (the guessing criterion and
exclusion task). Table 6 provides the PDP data once again, along with scores from the
subjective measures as applied to each of the PDP tests.

	
  

60	
  

	
  
PDP Measures of Conscious (Inclusion Task) and Unconscious Influences (Exclusion Task),
Chan Difference Scores on PDP, and Guessing Criterion on PDP
As a Function of BCS, Instruction, and Yoked Conditions
Condition

Inclusion

Exclusion

Chan
Inclusion
Exclusion

Guess
Inclusion
Exclusion

Familiarity BCS
Experimental
.02(.21)
.27(.16)
5(7)
3(7)
53(7)
62(18)
3-week Yoked
------1-week Yoked
.24(.26)
.16(.13)
8(7)
3(5)
57(8)
56(7)
Familiarity no-BCS
Experimental
.04(.13)
.29(.09)
5(5)
2(4)
52(2)
59(11)
3-week Yoked
------1-week Yoked
.16(.21)
.18(.11)
3(5)
0(1)
61(11)
64(24)
Rule-search BCS
Experimental
.09(.14)
.38(.17)
7(8)
3(5)
52(4)
59(20)
3-week Yoked
.01(.17)
.38(.08)
1(1)
0(1)
82(25)
58(10)
1-week Yoked
.08(.20)
.21(.08)
6(9)
3(5)
55(6)
57(7)
Rule-search no-BCS
Experimental
.21(.28)
.27(.18)
7(7)
1(1)
50(0)
51(2)
3-week Yoked
.17(.14)
.26(.14)
5(8)
5(8)
54(4)
50(0)
1-week Yoked
.03(.14)
.21(.13)
9(12)
4(6)
53(4)
57(6)
Cont 3-wk YBCS
.00(.12)
.19(.14)




Cont 3-wk Yno-BCS .00(.08)
.21(.18)




Cont 1-wk Yoked
0
0
0
0
0
0
Table 6. The Process Dissociation Procedure provides a measure of conscious (inclusion task) and
unconscious (exclusion task) knowledge of letter sequences that create grammatical strings. The Chan
Difference Score is the difference in average confidence between correct and incorrect classifications. A
maximum score of 50 denotes complete metaknowledge and 0 denotes complete tacit knowledge. The
Guessing Criterion is the total percentage of correctly classified letter strings while guessing, which uses
the total number of guesses as the baseline. Scores range from 50 to a maximum of 100, 50 represents no
unconscious knowledge 100 denotes complete unconscious knowledge according to this measure. Standard
deviations are provided parenthetically.  = scores unable to be determined due to chance level
performance.

Chan Difference Scores on PDP Inclusion and Exclusion Tests
Mixed-model analysis with BCS and Instruction as the between-subjects factors
and Chan difference scores as the within-subjects factors on the PDP inclusion and
exclusion tasks across the main experimental conditions revealed an interaction between
Chan difference scores and Instructions, F(1,67) = 4.75, p = .03, ηp2 = .07. Pairwise
comparisons indicated that Chan difference scores were significantly different in the rulesearch conditions (p < .01), with scores being higher for the inclusion task (M = 6.9, SE =
1.12) as compared against scores in the exclusion task (M = 1.9, SE = .81). This same
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trend was only marginally significant in the familiarity conditions (p = .08), with scores
slightly higher in the inclusion task (M =4.83, SE = 1.10) as compared to scores in the
exclusion task (M = 3.01, SE = .79).
Mixed-model analysis with BCS (BCS v. non-BCS) and Yoke (Instructor v.
Yokes) as the between-subjects factors and Chan difference scores as the within-subjects
factors on the PDP inclusion and exclusion tasks across the rule-search groups and their
three-week yoked counterparts (excluding controls because their scores failed to be
statistically distinguished from baseline in the inclusion condition) revealed a interaction
between Chan difference scores and Yoke, F(1,75) = 15.55, p < .01, ηp2 = .17. Pairwise
comparisons indicated that Chan difference scores were significantly different in the
instructor conditions (p < .01), with scores being higher for the inclusion task (M = 6.9,
SE = 1.12) as compared against scores in the exclusion task (M = 1.9, SE = .81). There
was no significant difference found in the scores of their yoked counterparts (p = .47),
scores for both, the inclusion task (M =3.06, SE = 1.00) and exclusion task (M = 2.51, SE
= .65) indicated the presence of metaknowledge. Chan difference scores on the threeweek yoked PDP test conditions seem to be overestimating the presence of
metaknowledge. This overestimation was far more pronounced in the non-BCS
conditions, where we would expect to find more metaknowledge.
Mixed-model analysis with BCS (BCS v. non-BCS), Instruction (Rule-search v.
Familiarity) and Instructor (Instructors v. Yoke) as the between-subjects factors and Chan
difference scores as the within-subjects factors on the PDP inclusion and exclusion tasks
across the main experimental groups and their one-week yoked counterparts revealed no
significant within-subjects effects. There was a three-way interaction between
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Instructions, BCS, and Yokes, F(1,142) = 4.92, p = .03, ηp2 = .03. Data were split along
the Instructor conditions to explore this interaction. The 2 (Rule-search v. Familiarity) X
2 (BCS v. non-BCS) X 2 (Inclusion v. Exclusion) mixed-model analysis across the main
experimental groups is located at the beginning of this section. The same analysis on the
one-week yoked groups revealed an interaction between Instruction and BCS, F(1,75) =
7.36, p < .01, ηp2 = .09. Pairwise comparisons indicated that Chan difference scores were
significantly different in the familiarity conditions (p = .02), with scores being lower for
the non-BCS conditions (M = 1.76, SE = 1.05) as compared against scores in the BCS
conditions (M = 5.66, SE = 1.16). There was no significant difference found in the rulesearch conditions (p = .18), scores for both, the non-BCS conditions (M =6.81, SE =
1.10) and BCS conditions (M = 4.70, SE = 1.13) indicated the presence of
metaknowledge. One again, the general trend in the data is to over-estimate the presence
of metaknowledge across conditions.
Guessing Criterion on PDP Inclusion and Exclusion Tests
Mixed-model analysis with BCS and Instruction as the between-subjects factors
and Guess as the within-subjects factors on the PDP inclusion and exclusion tasks across
the main experimental conditions revealed no significant within- or between-subjects
effects, [F(1,26) = .06, p = .82 and F(1,26) = .19, p = .67, respectively]. High levels of
tacit knowledge were indicated across all groups. The trend to overestimate tacit
knowledge seems to also be the case with the Guessing criterion across the PDP task
conditions.
Mixed-model analysis with BCS (BCS v. non-BCS) and Yoke (Instructor v.
Yokes) as the between-subjects factors and Chan difference scores as the within-subjects
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factors on the PDP inclusion and exclusion tasks across the rule-search groups and their
three-week yoked counterparts (excluding controls) revealed an interaction between
Guessing scores and Yokes, F(1,27) = 4.33, p = .05, ηp2 = .14. Pairwise comparisons
indicated that Guessing scores were significantly different in the yoked conditions (p =
.03), with scores being higher for the inclusion task (M = 68.3, SE = .04) as compared
against scores in the exclusion task (M = 53.9, SE = .03). There was no significant
difference found in the scores for instructors (p = .54), scores for both, the inclusion task
(M =51.1, SE = .04) and exclusion task (M = 51.1, SE = .03) indicated the presence of
tacit knowledge. The significant difference in the yoked conditions was due to the
uncharacteristically high guessing score in the three-week yoke non-BCS condition.
Review of the data revealed that when guess rates were very low (rates < 2) participants
were guessing correctly most of the time. This does indicate the presence of tacit
knowledge, but the very low guess rates may represent a delimiting factor in this
application.
Mixed-model analysis with BCS (BCS v. non-BCS), Instruction (Rule-search v.
Familiarity) and Instructor (Instructors v. Yoke) as the between-subjects factors and
Guessing scores as the within-subjects factors on the PDP inclusion and exclusion tasks
across the main experimental groups and their one-week yoked counterparts revealed a
single main effect of instruction, F(1,50) = 4.44, p = .04, ηp2 = .08. Scores in the
familiarity conditions (M = 57.9, SE = .01) were higher than those in the rule-search
conditions (M = 54.1, SE = .01). The general tendency to overestimate tactic knowledge
across all groups and conditions persisted.
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In summary of this section, it was hoped that applying subjective measure to the
PDP test would indicate a relationship between measures that shared common diagnostic
capabilities. This does not seem to be the case, as both the zero-correlation and guessing
criterion consistently overestimated their target knowledge. It is possible that the number
of letter strings on each task (N =16) is too low to allow for more accurate measures of
the type knowledge that is being applied across testing conditions. Low performance
rates on the PDP string-completion tests may also affect the accuracy. In short,
subjective measures used in such an application fail to provide any information about the
characteristics of the knowledge applied in PDP string-completion tasks.
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CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study was to examine characteristics of learning and
knowledge involved in AGL tasks and the heuristic value of measures used to
substantiate the cognitive unconscious. Results indicated convincing support for the
implicit acquisition of tacit knowledge that is at least partially abstract in representational
form. Metaknowledge was also indicated, suggesting that both forms of knowledge
operate in a synergistic fashion under certain conditions. There is some evidence for two
distinct learning processes, though implicit learning processes were most strongly
indicated. The experimental manipulations, subjective measures, and PDP posttest used
to provide evidence for the distinctness of implicit learning and the predominance of tacit
knowledge are discussed below.
Passive Abstraction
The effect of manipulating test instructions offers strong evidence for the passive
acquisition of knowledge of grammatical structure. The familiarity groups acquired as
much or more knowledge of the grammar when compared to rule-search groups.
Performance in the rule-search groups, particularly in the light of the generally poor
performance of their three-week yoked counterparts, also indicated the passive
acquisition of knowledge. The BCS manipulation provided further evidence for implicit
learning. The removal of chunk based information failed to discourage the acquisition of
knowledge. This was not only the case in the passive learning group, where we would
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expect less of an effect, but also in the intentional learning group. When we look at the
combined effects of these two manipulations across groups, we find that performance is
roughly equivalent between conditions designed to discourage as much explicit learning a
possible (the familiarity BCS condition) and those designed to encourage explicit
learning (the rule-search non-BCS condition). The generally poor performance of the
yoked participants in the rule-search non-BCS condition provides perhaps the strongest
support for the passive acquisition of knowledge. Under such conditions, instructors
should have been able to describe more of the knowledge they were using to classify
exemplars, if it was bound to the chunks of information made available. Performance
across both non-BCS conditions was generally better than that found in the BCS
conditions, so we must assume that the availability of chunks of information was driving
these performance improvements. This suggests that learning was bound to the
perceptual features of the exemplars but largely inaccessible to consciousness. This
consideration brings into question one of the other purposes of this research, which is to
characterize the representational form of acquired knowledge.
Representational Form of Knowledge
IL debates have centered on whether knowledge is bound only to the perceptual
features of exemplars or is more abstract in nature. Traditionally, representational forms
that are bound to perceptual features are considered to be more accessible to conscious
knowledge (Shanks and St. John, 1994). However, the results of this study indicate that
even though chunk based information was relied upon to some extent, it was largely
inaccessible for description. This suggests that at least some of what was learned was
abstract in nature. The performance in the transfer task on the third week, also confirms
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the abstract character of the representational form. This joint contribution of stimulusspecific and abstract knowledge is in line with interpretations from a number of other
studies (e.g., Conway & Christiansen, 2006; Manze & Reber, 1997; Mathews et. al,
1989). The results of this study seem to coincide with an abstractionist account of the
representational form of knowledge acquired during an AGL task, which do acknowledge
the importance of detecting patterns and simple associations upon which more abstract
forms of knowledge are based (Reber, 1989a). Hybrid models that have been advanced
which include both chunks and some abstract features (e.g., Mathew, et al., 1989), also
characterize the knowledge that was acquired and applied by participants in this study.
However, abstractionist accounts are typically associated with tacit knowledge (Reber,
1993), which presents an issue when attempting to account for the metaknowledge
indicated across most all experimental conditions.
Measures of Conscious and Unconscious Knowledge
The philosophical basis for the use of subjective measures of mental states is
established in a hierarchical framework of first- and second-order mental states. Firstorder states are bound to the initial activation of sensory mechanisms and second-order
states are mental states about first-order states. Much of the knowledge indicated in the
present study was tacit in nature, however, some metaknowledge was also indicated by
the zero-correlation criterion and the PDP inclusion task. The poor performance of the
yoked participants across all conditions seems to question the validity of such measures.
However, an account for metaknowledge that is not explicit in nature has been provided
by distinguishing a difference between structural knowledge and judgment knowledge (cf
Dienes & Berry, 1997; Dienes & Perner, 1999).
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Conceptually, the distinction is premised upon the difference between “knowing
something” and “knowing some thing.” The latter refers to explicit knowledge of the
grammatical structure of exemplars, the former is an intuitive sense of the
grammaticality. When structural knowledge is found to be largely unconscious, as was
the case in this study, judgment knowledge can be either unconscious or conscious in
nature (Dienes & Berry, 1997). Conscious judgment knowledge establishes the
phenomenological experience of an intuitive sense of the grammatical correctness of an
exemplar, much the same way that we understand the correctness of an English sentence.
We do not need to describe all the rules of grammar that make a sentence seem
grammatical. Unconscious judgment knowledge establishes the phenomenological
experience of guessing. In regards to guessing criterion, correct responses offered while
guessing elevates the guessing criterion scores, which indicates unconscious knowledge.
Yet, this measure does not evidence a lack of metaknowledge, it simply distinguishes the
presence of tacit knowledge. The zero-correlation criterion measures the difference
between confidence scores when correct and incorrect. Higher confidence when correct
and lower confidence when incorrect indicates the presence of some metaknowledge.
However, this measure alone does not tell us if the knowledge is due to an understanding
of the structure of the grammar or is better understood as an intuitive sense of the
underlying grammatical structure. The performance of the yoked participants in this
study provides the final piece of evidence to make this distinction. Yoked performance
was generally very low across all conditions, which indicates that the conscious
knowledge suggested by the zero-correlation and PDP inclusion test is best characterized
as conscious judgment knowledge.
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Intellectual Merit and Broader Impacts
A number of long-standing and intensely contested debates have persisted in the
field of IL. Debates revolve around the nature of the knowledge acquired in tasks
traditionally found to involve IL. Lending no small part in the debate has been the
reintroduction of the cognitive unconscious to scientific inquiry. Since that time, the
study of the cognitive unconscious has met many challenges from academic
psychologists, some going so far as to suggest that the concept of a cognitive unconscious
has no place in psychology (e.g., St. John & Shanks, 1997; Shanks & St. John, 1994).
Much of the difficulty involved in pursuing a scientific approach to the cognitive
unconscious is based on attempts to establish appropriate experimental methods to
highlight unconscious processes. Moreover, much of the contention and debate regarding
the scientific study of the cognitive unconscious rests on whether unconscious processes
are indeed qualitatively distinct entities that produce (or contribute to) distinct behavioral
characteristics.
One of the more relevant contributions of the current research was its effort to
determine the validity of indirect measures of the cognitive unconscious. As Dienes
(2008) has pointed out, the proof of the usefulness of the guessing and zero correlation
criteria is in their heuristic value, which “has scarcely been tested” (p. 54). The combined
effect of employing subjective measures, the PDP, yoked and transfer conditions, and the
instructional and BCS manipulations proved to be a productive approach to addressing
both the representational form and consciousness issues central to the IL debate.
This research advances the field of IL and the cognitive unconscious in a number
of ways. It provided evidence of the time-course of learning in AGL, which researchers
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in the field say are badly needed. It also provided a variety of measures of the
development of mental representations over training. The approach of including multiple
measures of conscious and unconscious knowledge provided the opportunity to determine
if such measures were in mutual agreement with theoretical expectations.
A practical broader application of the current research is how best to design
teaching and training methods. For example, it has been suggested that a period of
passive reflection on material before more intensive learning may lead to better
comprehension of material (Reber, 1993). The logic follows that passive interactions
with to-be-learned material creates a type of tacit framework that can better receive and
make sense of new information. Performance improvements in the incidental learning
conditions provided some support for this application. That is, the familiarization process
provided for the “passive acquisition” of the structure of the AG, which then provided for
the detection of patterns and co-variations in exemplars that seem to fit the structure. In
general, our understanding of how the cognitive unconscious operates will aid in creating
more effective and efficient learning environments, whether it is the physical aspects of
an actual classroom or a computer environment. Another practical benefit of research in
the field of IL and the cognitive unconscious is its application to the design of devices to
make them more “user-friendly.” Technological advancements, in some cases, seem to
have outpaced what minds can work with at a functional level. Advances in our
understanding of human learning (and memory) will aid in the development of products
that enable rather than frustrate human capacities. This final consideration will no doubt
prove very useful in a world where human interaction with technology increases with
each passing year.
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